




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UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545



April 27, 1973

Honorable James R. Schlesinger
Director,
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

DOE review completed.

Dear Jim:

As I am sure you know, the USSR is now offering to provide commercial uranium enrichment services to countries outside the Soviet bloc. In fact, they have already begun negotiations to provide enriching services for nuclear reactors in France and the Federal Republic of Germany. We understand discussions have also taken place with other countries.

With the entrance of the Soviets into the world commercial enriching market, it would be useful to be able to discuss their uranium enrichment capacity on an unclassified basis. I know that personally I would like to have been able to use such a number in unclassified discussions that I have had.

I would like to suggest that you have your people look into this matter to see if there is an unclassified number that could be used for the USSR uranium enrichment capacity. Along this same line it would be useful to be able to use an unclassified number for the Peoples Republic of China's uranium enrichment capacity also. This is not so important however, since they are not involved in providing commercial services.

Anything you can do on this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

Clarence
C. E. Larson
Commissioner

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1287-731

25 MAY 1973

Honorable Clarence S. Larson
 Commissioner,
 Atomic Energy Commission
 Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Sir:

In response to your letter dated 27 April 1973 to Dr. Schlesinger to declassify estimates of Soviet uranium enrichment capacity, we can provide numbers we believe to be reasonably valid on the basis of a confidential report. This report includes statements made by I. M. Morokhov, Deputy Chairman of the Soviet State Committee on the Uses of Atomic Energy to Ambassador Dwight Porter. I understand that Ambassador Porter has been requested by your Director of International Programs to declassify this portion of the Morokhov conversation which, if approved, will permit the release of the attached estimate on an unclassified basis.

Our estimate of Soviet separative capacity through 1985 derived from the above information is attached. Unfortunately, there is no comparable data of low classification upon which we could base an unclassified estimate of uranium enrichment capacity for the Peoples Republic of China.

25X1

Sincerely,

Carl E. Duckett
 Deputy Director
 for
 Science and Technology

Attachment: as stated

DU/S&T
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SIGNATURE RECOMMENDED:

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[Redacted Signature Box]

Director of Scientific Intelligence

24 MAY 1973

Date

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OSI/NED/NTB

[Redacted Box]

(17 May 1973)

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ATTACHMENT

1. Morokhov indicated that Soviet enrichment capacity is now adequate to supply all of Europe including Western Europe with enrichment services based on the demand curve to 1985 "using the old plants."

2. The exact demand curve he referred to is unknown, but the most recent AEC projection of Western European demands for enrichment services calls for a cumulative demand of about 105,000 metric tons of separative work from 1972 to 1985 inclusive. In the same time frame, Soviet commitments to the nuclear power programs of these Communist Bloc countries, including the USSR, call for about 23,000 metric tons separative work cumulative. The requirements of all of Europe including Western Europe, therefore, total about 128,000 metric tons of separative work.

3. Assuming Soviet technological improvements to their gaseous diffusion plants might parallel the US Cascade Improvement Program, we have increased their plant capacity at a similar rate for the period 1972 to 1980, and a steady production rate will prevail thereafter. The Soviet plant capacity was obtained by adjusting the area under the above curve until it matches the cumulative production. It was found that the Soviet plant capacity was about 6,400 metric tons separative work in 1972 increasing to about 10,500 metric tons separative work in the 1980-1985 period. The 1973 production rate is estimated to be about 6,900 metric tons separative work.

4. It should be noted that portions of this capacity will be needed to meet Soviet submarine reactor fuel requirements and requirements for nuclear weapons. In any case, Morokhov did not indicate that the entire Soviet enrichment capacity was available for sale.

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CONFIDENTIALSUMMARY OF SEPARATIVE WORK PRODUCTION AND REQUIREMENTS(Metric Tons SWU)

<u>Mid Year</u>	<u>W. Europe Requirements</u>	<u>Soviet Bloc Power Reactor Requirements</u>	<u>Soviet Projected Capacity (Proportional)</u>
1972	1158	357	6368
1973	1928	557	6883
1974	2626	462	7398
1975	3543	1262	7913
1976	3014	1322	8428
1977	5496	1345	8943
1978	5544	1630	9458
1979	7900	1928	9973
1980	8303	2009	10488
1981	10045	2009	10488
1982	12050	2009	10488
1983	12603	2009	10488
1984	15420	3000	10488
1985	<u>15784</u>	<u>3000</u>	<u>10488</u>
Cumulative	105414	22899	128292
Gross European Requirements	128,313		

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